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It is shown that the Harsanyi~Selten solution of a dominance solvablegame need
not coincide with the unique equilibrium to which this game can be reduced by
means of successive elimination of dominated strategies. 'This result also remains
valid if the Harsanyi~Selten theory is modified by dropping the Pareto dominance
requirement. The examples presented give insight into important features of the
Ilarsanyi~Selten equilibrium selection theory.
1 Introduction
Ever since it was discussed in LIICE AND RAIFFA (1957) (sce especially p. 100), the it-
erated elimination of domínated strategies has been advanced as a necessary requirement
for `rational' play. Accordingly, many expositions of game theory begin with a discussion
oí dominated strategies and appeal to equilibrium notions only when the procedure of
iterated deletion oí dominated strategies has proved to be incapable of reducing the game
Lo a singlc strategy combination. Examples of textbooks with this property are KRF.PS
(1990), h10l1LIN ( 19H`L) aud MYl'.Ii.SON (1990)). All thcsc aiil.hors notc thc difTcrenccs
between it.crative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and the iterative elimina-
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1 Introduction
[?ver sinca~ it was discussed in I,UCE AND RAIFFA (1957) (see especially p. 100), the it-
erated elimination of dominated strategies has been advanced as a necessary requirement
for `rational' play. Accordingly, many expositions of game theory begin with a discussion
of dominated strategies and appeal to equilibrium notions only when the procedure of
iterated deletion of dominated strategies has proved to be incapable of reducing the game
to a single strategy rombination. Examples of textbooks with Lhis property are KRF.PS
(1990), MOIILIN ( I!)Sl) and MYI?RSON (1990)). All thcsc aut.hors notc Lhc di(fercuccs
bctwmn itcrative elimination ot strictly dominated strategies and the iterative elimina-
tion of strategies Lhat are only wcakly dorninatcd. There seems Lo be a consensus thatthe former should not affect the analysis of the game,r but that applying weak domi-
nance can be problematic, because of the fact that a weakly dominated strategy can bc
a best nsponse of a player if he feels confident that some strategies of the others occur
only with probability zero.
Recently, KOEILE3ERG AND MEFtTENS (1986) have strongly argued in favor of
thc iterated dominance requirement in its strong form, i.e. that iteratively eliminating
wc.;ikly duniinated sl.ratcgic~s should nol, a(Tcct Lhc~ gamc's outro~nc. On p. 1019 of t.hcir
pccpcr they write
`One might argue that, since dominated strategies are never actually chosen,
and since all players know this, then deletion of such strategies can have no
impact on strategic stability. This would lead to requiring that a strategi-
cally stable equilibrium remain so when a dominated strategy is deleted (and
hence, when the deletion is done iteratively).'
'I'hcy go on to note t.hat unfortunately, in this strong form this requirement is incompat-
ible with existence, because of the fact that the outcome of the process may depend on
t.hc ordcr in which thc stratcgies arc climinated. Therefore, Kohlberg and Mertens only
ask for inclusion. Specifically they list as one of their main requirements for strategic
stability
llerated-Dominance: A sotution oj a game C contains a sotution oJ any game
C' obtained 6y G by dcletion oj a dominated strategy.~
'E'his requirement implies that a solution should not vanish entirely when a dominated
~COOPER et.al. (1990) provide evidence that strictly dominated strategies may influence the be-
havior of subjects that participate in gamea that are played in the laboratory.
zKohlherg and Mertens use the term `dominated' in the meaning ot `weakly dominated' and I'll use
the same convention in the remainder ofthe paper. Note that every Nash equilibrium survives interated
rliiiiinal.i~~n of strictly dorninat~~d strategics.3
strategy is delcted, hence ncithcr should it vanish when the deletion is done iteratively.
Elsewhere (VAN DAMME ( 1989)) the author has given examples to show that requiring
invariance under iterated dominance may produce highly counterintuitive results. The
problems are caused by the fact that a strategy s; of player i may be dominated (and
hence eliminated) because of (and only because of) the presence of a strategy s~ of player
j that it.sclf is elirninated in a IaLer stage of the proccdure. If this situation occurs, then
player i eventually concludes that player j will not play s„ but why then shouldn't he
play s„ and why is it justificd that playcr j climinates s;? A similar point has bcrn madc
in SAMUELSON ( 1989) whcre it is also shown that iterated elimination of dominated
strategies is not equivalent to the assumption of admissibility being common knowledge.
Hence, one may say that there is some disagreement in the profession about whether
sa.t.isfact.ory solution concepts should satisfy the iterated dominance requirement.
[n this paper, [ demonstrate that the theory of equilibrium selection that has been
rccently proposed in H.ARSANYI AND SELTEN (1988) prescribes, in some games, so-
lutions that violate the iterated dominance requirement. The demonstration will be by
means of three examples that are in no way pathological, specifically, the elimination
procedure is very well-behaved, any ordec of elimination produces the same unique out-
come. It is also shown that some modifications of the theory (which are suggested as
possible alternatives by the authors) do not lead to different results. As an example of
such a modification, let us mention that the conclusion would be unchanged if, in the
Ila.rsanyi~Scltcn Lhcory, onc wonld not insist on the Pareto dominance criterion, but
r:,lh,.r w„ul,l jutil. i,,:,k,~ n.,, ,d ri~k ilun,iuan,,~ rurulucrisuus. I:dsu vhuw Lhut Lhc inu,li
ficd thcory that has bcen proposccí in Gl1'Cli AND KALKOFEN (1989) may simimlarly
prescribc a solutiou tliat does uot satisfy the iterated dorninance requirement.
The reason why these selection theories yield a solution that dces not survive when
dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated is that, to find the solution of a game G,
one should not apply the theory to G directly but rather to a sequence G` of (uniformly)
perturbed games and then investigate the limit of this sequence as e tends to zero. The4
thcories adopt this roundabout way to guarantee that the solution of C is a perfect
equilibrium of G. Note that a perfect equilibrium is one in undominated strategies
so that the solution prescribed by Harsanyi~Selten or Guth~Kalkofen certainly has not
vanished after one round ofelimination. Ilowever, perturbing thegame may convert weak
inequalities into strict ones, so that G` need not necessarily be dominance solvable when
G has this property. Indeed this is the case in the examples discussed below: Perturbing
the game, changes some weak equilibria into strict ones. The solution theories pick for
the perturbed game G` a strict equilibrium of G` that converges to an equilibrium of
G that is only weak and that vanishes when weakly dominated strategies are deleted
itcratively.a
2 Dominance and Perturbations
~or convcnience, att.ention will be restricted to 2-person normal form games. Let G-
( Xr, X2, ur, rr2) be such a garne, where X; is a finite set of strategics for player i and
u; : Xr x.~z --~ R is this player's payoff function. S; denotes the set of mixed strategies
of playcr i and u; is extended bilinearly Irom Xr x X~ to Sr x Sz. The strategy s; is said
to be (weakly) dominated if there exists some strategy s; such that
u;(s„s~) 1 u;(s;,s~) (all s~), and u;(s„s~) 1 u;(s;,s~) (some s~) (2.1)
G' is said to result jrom G by elimination oj dominated strategies if G' -(Xi, X2, ut, u2)
with X~ C X; and cach strategy X;`X~ is dominated in C. (Note that we do not insist
that a11 dominated strategies are eliminated simultaneously.) The game G is said to be
rlonainanrr, solvablr if
'rL~ Ihi~ rraprct it ix al.~i worthwhile t.o draw attrntinn Lo DF.KF:L ANI) FIlpENHF:ItG (1987) in
wbich iL i. pointed out that the iterateJ dmniuance rcquirorncnt rclicx on the (xtrong) aaxurnption Lhat
players have no doubta about their opponenta' payoffa. These authora show that, once auch slight doubta
~~xiyt, all that can be juatified is one round o! dcletion o! weakly dominated strategiealollowed by iterated
Jeletion of xtrictly dominated atrategies. Any perfect equilibrium (hence, in particular the HS aolution)
survivea lhix e.limination procedure.( i) there exists a sequence Gp, G~, ..., G" with
(a) Gktl results from Gk by eliminating dominated strategies,
(b) Go - G,
(c) in Cn each player has exactly one pure strategy, and
(ii) if Go, ..., G" and Go, ..., Gm satisfY (~), then G" - Gm.
Hence, we require that elimination yields a unique outcome and that all orders of elim-
ination produce the same outcome. If the game G is dominance solvable, this unique
outcome will be called the ID-solution of G. (It should be noted that our definition
of dominance solvability is more restrictive (and less subject to criticism) than the one
proposcd in MOULIN (198'l).)
We now turn to the concepts of risk dominance and of payofí dominance. Let s, s' be
two equilibria of G. We say that s payoff dominates s' if
u;(s) ~ u;(s') for i - 1,2 (2.2)
Assume that s and s' are strict equilibria, i.e. s; is the unique best reply against s~ (i ~ j),
and similarly for s'. Clearly, strict equilibria are necessarily in pure strategies. Suppose
thaL the players find themselves in the situation, where it is common knowledge that
the solution of G must be either s or s' without knowing which of both is the solution.
Risk dominance tries to capture the idea that in this state of confusion players enter a
process of expectation formation that may lead them to conclude that one equilibrium
is less risky than the other. Let player i assign probabilíty a to the event that player
j chuu.~.. .Y~, óoncr, hr atta.~ h~~s probability I- a to thc cv~~nl, that j chooscs s~. '1'hon
player i will play a best response against the mixed strategy (1 - a)s~ f as~. Denote
the sct of pure best responscs against this mixed strategy by B;(1 -~)s~ f as~. Let us
assume that6
f3;((1 -~)s~ f asj) C{s;,s;} for all a E[0, 1), all i (2.3)
and d~,(ini~
r;(s,s') - max {a E[9, 1], ll;((1 - a)s~ -~ as~) - {.v;}} (2.4)
Note that, if r;(s,s') is large, then player i can attach a relatively high probability to
player j playing sj and still be justified in playing s;. HARSANYI AND SELTEN (1988)
define risk dominance in an elaborate way by using the tracing procedure. It is beyond
tlie scope of this paper to provide that definition here. Fortunately for our purpose an
alternative characterization of risk dominance is available in the special case where (2.3)
is satisfic.d. We providc this characterization as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. (cf. HARSANYI AND SELTEN (1988, Thm 5.4.2.) IJ condition
(2.3) is satisfied, then s risk dominates s' (written s Y s'J iJ and only iJ
r~ (s, s') f r2(s, s') ~ 1 (2.5)
For our purposes it suffices to take the characterization provided by the proposition
as the definition of risk dominance. Note that (2.5) is equivalent to
rr(s,s')rz(s,s') ~ r~(s',s)rZ(s',s) (2.6)
a condition that says that, in the game where only s and s' are available, the stability7
region of the equilibrium s(i.e. the region where this equilibrium is a best response) has
a larger area than the stability region ot equilibrium s'.
Let m; be the number of strategies in X; and let E~ 0 be such that m;E C 1. If s; is
a mixed (or pure) strategy of player í, then s; is the completely mixed strategy defined
by
s;(x;) -(1 - m;e)s;(x;) t E (x; E X;)
The interpretation of s; is that, if player i intends to play s;, but due to mistakes also
chooses each pure strategy with probability e, then player i will actually choose x; with
probabilit.y s;(x;). "1'he unifonn3y perturbcd game G` is the game C` -(Xr, Xz,u„u~)
whcrc~
u~(xr,xz) - u~(xi,x`s) ((xr,xz) E Xr x Xz) (2.8)
Hence, the perturbed game is an ordinary 2-person normal form game which models the
trcmbles in the playcrs' actions by slightly modifying the payoffs from the original game.
We are finally in the position to outline the main steps of the Harsanyi~Selten theory,
a.l. Icast. a5 far a.v t.6~-y apply to t.hc cxarnplcs to be discusscd hrlow. (i'or rnorc detail thc
rcader is rofcrrcd to thc flowchart on p. `l2'L of llAItSANYI ANll SLL'I'LN (1988).)
IISI Prrturh thc~ gamc. "I'hc~ solution f(C~) is (ound as f(C) - Ir~ó f(C`)
IIS2 [n the perturbed game G`, eliminate the inferior pure strategics. (In a 2-person
normal Corm game a pure strategy is inferior iff it is dominated.)
fIS:3 '1'he initial solution candidates are the strict equilibria of C`.
4AS IIa11aI we identify the pure atrategy x; with the mixed atrategy that assigna probability 1 to x;.s
HS4 If there is a solution candidate in G`, say s, that payoff dominates all others, then
9 - I(G`).
IltiFi If Lh~~re is a solution candidate, say s, that risk dominates all others, then s-
!(~~` )-
Clearly payoffdominance is a transitive relationship. Risk dominance may be intran-
sitive, however (see the example in Sect. 4). To break such ties Harsanyi and Selten
propose
HS6 If the solution candidates of G` are s,s' and s", and we have s~ s' r s" ~- s,
then s- f(C`) if for each player í, strategy s; is the unique best response against
(s~ -~ s~ f s~)~3.
3 An Example Using Payoff Dominance
Consider the game Cl from Figure 1
(insert N'igure 1 about here]
G~ is clearly dominance solvable with only C- (C1,C2) beíng the ID-solution. We
will show that the IIS-solution of this game, is B- (B1,B2). To prove the claim we
follow the steps HS1 - HS4 from the previous section. We first compute the perturbed
game. Note that, for example
u~(A~, AZ) - (1 - 2~) ((1 - 2e)ul(A~, Az) ~ eut(A~, Bz) -~ eu~(Ar,C~))
fE ((1 - iE)ul(Bl, A2) t Elll(Bl, B2) f Ettl(Bl, C2))
~E ((1 - Zf)Yi~(G~, AY1 ~ ET41(CI, BY) -i~ Eul(G1, C2)) -
To simplify notation we will ueglect terms of order e~, a simplification that is justificd9
since all dominance comparisons in C~ are by means of strict inequalities, hence, they
will remain to be satisfied also when the terms with e~ are included. Keeping the simpli-
liral.iun in ~niml, thc reach~r inay v~~rify that the payoff matrix of C~ is givcn as in Figurc~
IE
[insert Figure lE about here]
One sees that A; is strictly dominated in G„ hence, HS2 says that we should elimi-
nate Ar and A2, since these will not be chosen by intention. However, these actions may
h~ choscn by mistakc and Lhe fact that B; docs bettcr against A~ as C; dces implies
that B-(B~, BZ) is a strict equilibrium of G~. Condition HS3 says that the solution
candidates of Gi are B and C and HS4 implies that B is the HS-solution of Gi since B
payoff dominates C. By HS1, therefore, B is the HS-solution of Gr.
Note that in the game Gl, the equilibrium C risk dominates the equilibrium B.
Namely we have
rr (C, B) - rz(C, B) -(1 - 8e)~(1 - 6e)
so that r~ (C, B) f r2(C, 13) ~ 1 if e is sufficiently small. Ilence, the example may lead
the readcr to think that the discrepancy between the ID-solution and the HS-solution
is caused by the fact that the latter makes use of the Pareto dominance criterion. As
Harsanyi and Selten point out there is also some interest in a theory that uses only risk
dominance comparisons. In the next section we show that this change in the theory
(that is dropping requirement HS4) will not change the negative result obtained in this
section. We will denote the solution obtained by applying the HS-postulates from Sect.
2 except HS4 by the HS'-solution.io
4 An Example Using Only Risk Dominance
Consider the game Gz from Figure 2 which is simply the game from Figure 1 enlarged
with another strategy D;. Again this game is dominance solvable with ID-solution
C-(C~,Cz). Neglecting terms of order e~, the payoff matrix of Gz is given in Fig-
ure 2e.
[ins~~rL 1~igures 'l and 2e about here]
In Came G2i the strategy D; is strictly dominated, hence, it may be deleted. The
equilibria A, B and C are all strict equilibria for e~ 0, E suf['iciently small. Let us
investigate the risk dominance relationships between these equilibria. It is easily seen
t hat, for s, s' E { A, I3, C} and for each e) 0, the condition from (2.3) is satisfied.
(Note that this condition is no longer satisfied if e- 0, for example B; is a best response
against a mixture of A~ and C~.) Let r;(s, s') be defined as in (2.4) and let r; (s, s') be the
corresponding quantity for the game G~. It is also easily seen that, for s, s' E {A, B, C},
the map r;(s, s') is continuous in e. Now, for i- 1, 2 we have
r;(A, B) - 1
r;(B,C) - 1
ri(C, A) - 3~4
so that, (ur cach e 1 0 su((ici~~ntly small
ArB~CrA,
hence, the risk dominance relationship is cyclic. To determine the solution we, therefore,
have to turn to HS6 and we obviously find j(Gz) - B. Hence, the HS'-solution of Gz is11
eyuilibrium B.
IL is clear that, in the above example, the reason that the HS'-solution vanishes when
dominated strategies are eliminated, lies in the fact that condition HS6 dces not reflect
the intensity of the risk dominance comparison. Once there are intransitivities among
three equilibria, HS6 stipulates that players expect each of these equilibria to occur with
probability r~3 even though the dominance relationship may be very asymmetric. In
game G2 one might argue that, since C very strongly risk dominates B, B very strongly
risk dominates A and A only is just `slightly' stronger than C, players will put high prior
probability on C, an of course in this case they will come to conclude that they actually
should play C. ("I'he uniquc best response against pr A; t pz B~ -1- p~C; is C~ is p3 is large
cnough.) (On pp. 228-229 of their book, Ilarsanyi and Selten motivate their use of HS6,
the rcadcr can vcrify that thc alternativc of workiug with the `multilateral prior' instead
of the `centroid' would not lead to dífferent results in game Gá.) In the next section
wc providc~ another cxample t.hat docs not rely on intransitiviticw of the risk dominance
relation to show that the HS'-solution need not be identical to the ID-solution, hence,
making use of intensities of risk dominance canrrot eliminate the discrepancy.
5 An Example Not Relying on Intransitivity
The suggestion to make use of the intensity of the risk dominance relation has first been
made by Gi1TH AND KALKOFEN (1989) in their modification of the HS-theory. There
are three main differences between these two theories:
(i) llarsanyi~Selten allow correlated strategies as beliefs whereas Guth~Kalkofen only
allow independent mixed strategies.
(ii) Giit.ó~Kalkofen do not give preference to `prirnitive' cyuilibria, they do not insist
uu Ilti:f. Instcad thcy a~ld a logarithmic tcrm to Lhc gamc, which thcy clairn, will
ensurc that thc pcrturbed game has only strict equilibria and, moreovet, a rinite
number of them (See GUTH AND KALKOFEN ( 1989, p. 111)).(iii) Ciith~Kalko(i~n re,plae~~ the: iutransitivc risk dominancc relation by the transitivc
resistance avoidance relation.
For our purposes, difference ( i) is not important since it does not arise in 2-person games.
As far as (ii) is concerned we will not follow Guth~Kalkofen since the logarithmic term
appears ad hoc and since the functioning of the procedure rests on an unproven conjec-
ture. Hence, we concentrate on (iii). Guth~Kalkofen call the quantity r;(s, s') defined
in (2.4) player i's resistance against s' in view of s and they define the (normalized)
resistance of s against s' as




Note that r(s,s') 7 0 if s and s' are strict equilibria. Guth~Kalkofen propose to look
for that equilibrium against which the maximal resistance is minimal. Hence, let R(s')
be the vector C r(s, s') ~,~,~ arranged in nonincreasing order, i.e. the highest resistance
value first, etc. Giith~Kalkofen propose to replace HS6 by
GI{6 In G` choose the solution candidate s for which the resistance vector R(s) is lexi-
cographically minimaL (This equilibrium s is called the resistance dominant equi-
librium.)
Note from (2.6) that if s risk dominates any other equilibrium, then
r(s, s') ~ 1~ r(s', s) for all s' ~ s,
hence, the first component of R(s) is smaller than the first component of R(s') if s' ~ s.
Consec{uently, resistance dominance is in agreement with risk dominance if there is a
uniquc risk dominanL cquilibriurn, and CK6 can bc vicwcd as a way to brcak intransi-
tivities of the risk dominance relationship.13
Returning to the examplc from the previous section, we see that we have, as e--. 0
IZ`(A) -. (9,0)
It`(!3) ~ (00,0)
R`(G) -a (oo, ~~9)
and we see that, if e is sufficiently small, R`(A) is lexicographically minimal. Hence, A
is resistant dominant in this example. Our next example, however, shows that resistance
dominance does not always produce the outcome that remains after all dominated strate-
gies have been iteratively deleted. Specifically we give an example of a game with a risk
dominant equilibrium that is not the ID-solution. Hence, we show that a solution theory
based on HS1 - HS3 and IISS does not single out the stable equilibrium for dominance
solvable games.
[insert Figure 3 about here~
The game Ga from Figure 3 is similar to game Gz, the difference being that (Bl, B2) is
not an equilibrium in G3. Again Ga is dominance solvable with ID-solution C- (Cl, C2).
The imiformly perturbed gamc G3 is given in Figure 3e. One sees that G3 admits two
strict equilibria, viz. A and C, and that (2.3) is satisfied for these equilibria. In addition
C3 has three ( symmetric) equilibria in mixed strategies, viz. players randomize among
A ancí B, or among B and C, or among A, B and C. Because of HS3 only A and C are
solution candidates, however. Now we have that, as e~ 0, r;(A, C) -a '~4 for i- 1, 2,
hi~ua~, for E stnall enough A risk dominates C. (Ilence, A also resistance dominates C.)
Therefore, the solution obtained for C.~ by applying ílSl - IIS3 and IISS is A, and this
is difCcrent from the Ill-solution of G~.[insert Figure 3e about here]
6 Conclusion
The above examples have given additional insights into important features of the
Iiarsanyi~Selten solution theory. One way to paraphrase the results is by saying that
the order in which the solution steps involved in the Harsanyi~Selten theory are applied
matters: If the risk dominance (or the Pareto dominance) criterion is applied directly
to the unpcrturbcd game, one fiuds a different solution in each oC the examples above.
Harsanyi~Selten use the uniformly perturbed game to guarantee perfectness of Lhe HS
solution. What the above exa~nples dernonstrate is that the HS solution need not be a
proper equilibrium ( MYEIiSON ( 1978)): In each of the games C; discussed above only
C-(C~,Cz) is a proper equilibriurn. Furthermore, all games given above are symmetric
so that the notion of ESS (evolutionary stable strategies, MAYNARD SMITH ( 1982)) is
well-defined for them. In each game only C is an ESS, hence, the HS-solution need not
be an ESS. (See VAN DAMME ( 1987a, Thm 9.3.4.) for the proof that, if s is an ESS,
then (s,s) is a proper equilibrium.) As is well-known, evolutionary stability is a local
stability notion. On the contrast, iterated dominance is a kind of global relationship.
Although in the above examples the ID-solution coincides with the ESS it should, there-
fore, not come as a surprise that examples can be constructed in which the ID-solution
is not an ESS. (NACHBAR ( 1990, Example 2), VAN DAMME ( 1987b, Fig. 4).)
An important class of dominance solvable games is the class of normal form games
arising from generic extensive forms with perfect information (MOULIN (1979)). The
reader should not conclude from the above examples that the HS solution for such ex-
tensive form games difters from the subgame perfect equilibrium. The point is that
Harsanyi~Sclten do not solve a game via its norrnal forrn but rather via the so-called
standard form. Thc latter basically is the agent normal forrn supplemented with in-1~)
forrnation about which agents belong to the same player. Indeed, the Harsanyi~Selten
solution of an extensive form game may differ from the solution of the normal form of
this garne. We conclude with the game from Figure 4 that gives an example where this
hapt~ens.
[insert Figure 4 about here]
In the extensive form there is a subgame starting with the second decision made of player
1. Using I~S1 - HS5 one sees that the solution of this subgame is (r, R2). Harsanyi~Selten
adopt the principle ofsubgame consistency, implying that player 1 realizes that, if he de-
~ iJ~~s to play Lhe subganrc, hc is forccd to play according to thc solution (r, R~). Ylaycr 1,
t.h~~rcfore, c hcxises L~ and thc I IS-solution of the extensive forrn of the game is (I,rr,RZ).
1~igure 4e gives the uniformly pcrturbed game associated with the normal form. The
strategy lr~r is strictly dominated, hence, it may be eliminated. '1'he strategies Lrl and
l,~r are duplicates, hence, they may be replaced by their equivalence class Lr. (See
IIARSANYI AND SELTEN (1988, Fig. 3.29).) The resulting 2 x 2 game has 2 strict
equilibria, viz. (Lr, Rz) and (Rrl, L~). Neither of these equilibria payoff dominates the
other, but (R~1, L2) risk dominates (L1i R2). Hence, the HS-solution of the normal form
is (Rrl,L2).
[inscrt Figure 4e about here]
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